Trade and the distributional politics of international labour standards by Oslington, Paul
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Trade and the distributional politics of
international labour standards
Paul Oslington
2005
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/963/
MPRA Paper No. 963, posted 29. November 2006
  
 
TRADE AND THE DISTRIBUTIONAL POLITICS OF  
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS 
   
Paul Oslington*
 
 
 
JEL Subject Classification:  F16, J80. 
JEL Keywords:  Trade, International Labour Standards, Harmonization 
 
*Correspondence to Paul Oslington, School of Business, University of New South Wales/Australian 
Defence Force Academy, Northcott Drive, Canberra 2602, Australia.    
Email: p.oslington@adfa.edu.au    Phone: 61-2-6268 8720      
Web:  http://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/sbus/staff_cvs/about_paul_osling.html 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper constructs a simple general equilibrium model of the trade and distributional effects of 
spreading advanced country international labour standards to developing countries.  Labour standards 
(including minimum safety requirements, prohibition of prison and child labour, and rights to unionise) 
are represented as a floor to the cost of employing labour.   The model shows how the spread of 
standards affects the terms of trade and pattern of international specialisation, and can shift unskilled 
unemployment from advanced to developing countries, redistribute income among groups of factor 
owners in different countries.   Political support for labour standards is predicted to come from a 
coalition of advanced country unskilled workers with insecure jobs and the secure unskilled in 
developing countries.  Opposition is predicted from owners of other factors. Overall country lobbying 
positions in international forums will depend on the relative strengths of the groups within the country. 
1)  INTRODUCTION  
 
The relationship between international labour standards and trade has been vexed in recent years. At the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) there have been several strong pushes to include labour standards in 
multilateral trade negotiations, notably at the Singapore ministerial in 1996 and the ill-fated 1999 
Seattle meetings.   While linking trade and labour standards seems off the current WTO agenda, recent 
regional and bilateral trade agreements have included labour standards, for instance the NAFTA side 
agreement, US-Chile and US-Singapore deals.  In fact under the US Free Trade Act of 2002 all future 
trade agreements must consider labour standards.  Labour standards have become more important in 
Europe also with many new binding EC directives on occupational health and safety, discrimination etc 
combined with the growing size of the EC.  Linking trade and labour standards raises many questions, 
including whether trade with countries with lower standards is “fair”, whether any restrictions on 
“unfair” trade are appropriate, whether different countries standards should be harmonized, and what 
are appropriate mechanisms for setting and enforcing labour standards.   
 
The view we take of many of these questions depends our understanding of the effects of international 
labour standards on incomes of different types of countries and groups within countries.  However, 
despite the prominence of international labour standards on the political agenda, there has been 
surprisingly little formal modelling.  General discussions of international labour standards include 
Bhagwati and Hudec (1996), Lee (1997), Maskus (1997),  Brown (2001), Elliott and Freeman (2003), 
and  Basu (2003).   Formal general equilibrium modelling has been carried out in a pioneering paper by 
Brown, Deardorff and Stern (1996) but there is not yet a consensus about the  appropriate way to 
represent labour standards, nor about their effects on the incomes of various countries and groups 
within countries. 
 
This paper constructs a simple general equilibrium trade model which captures some important aspects 
of the spread of labour standards.  It differs from existing models in the way the standard is represented, 
in dealing with the unemployment consequences of labour standards, and in considering the effect of 
the spread of labour standards on the pattern of international specialisation. Section two will discuss 
these modelling issues, section three describes the equilibrium in the model before the imposition of the 
standard, and sections four to six derive effects and discuss the politics of the spread of standards.   
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2) MODELLING ISSUES 
 
Some issues need to be resolved when modelling the spread of labour standards.  The first is the 
representation of the standard.   Maskus (1997) and  Brown, Deardorff and Stern (1996 p236-44) 
suggest particular market failures the standard might be correcting.     Brown, Deardorff and Stern 
(1996 p245-254) then go on to represent standards as an activity which draws resources away from 
other activities, shrinking the production possibility frontier, but contributing to welfare in other 
indirect ways.  A slightly different specification has the standard increasing costs in a particular 
industry, with the same indirect contribution to welfare.    Under this approach to modelling the 
standard results hinge on the factor intensity of the standard. 
 
In the present paper the standard will be represented as an exogenous floor to the cost of employing 
labour that applies to all industries.  This means labour standards push up the cost to firms of 
employing labour to some floor level, and that the standard only affects labour which would otherwise 
have cost firms less than the floor.  The benefit of the standard to workers is assumed to be equal to the 
extra cost to firms of meeting the standard, and goes directly to the workers concerned.  Specifying the 
standard this way avoids the issue of valuing indirect benefits to society of standards.  An important 
consequence of this representing the standard as wage floor is that it will generate unemployment in the 
same way as any other wage floor, so that unemployment consequences of labour standards can be 
considered.  Some actual labour standards correspond to a wage floor quite closely (eg minimum safety 
standards, prohibitions of forced labour and child labour, provisions that support unionization) while 
others fit less well (eg restrictions on hours worked), but the same is true of the other ways of modeling 
standards in the literature.   
 
The second issue to be resolved is the type of model in which to embed the chosen representation of the 
labour standard.  General equilibrium trade models seem particularly appropriate as they consider 
linkages between countries, as well as between factor and goods markets.  Several standard competitive 
general equilibrium models of  trading economies were used by Brown, Deardorff and Stern (1996)  
and a similar framework will be used here.  Within competitive general equilibrium trade modelling 
there are many important choices about numbers of goods and factors, patterns of specialisation, and 
whether to include non-traded goods and so forth.  A crucial question is whether to build factor price 
equalisation into the model, and while useful simplification for some purposes, it is not appropriate  
here as effects of  the spread of labour standards on different countries wage levels is a central issue.  
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3)  EQUILIBRIUM BEFORE THE SPREAD OF THE STANDARD 
 
Consider a simple general equilibrium trade model with two goods X and Y,   with X the numeraire so 
that relative goods prices are represented by PY.   Factors of production are labour L and skill H1, with 
prices w and h.  Good X is assumed relatively skill intensive, and Y labour intensive. There are two 
countries, developing D and advanced A, with developing countries assumed to be relatively well 
endowed with unskilled labour.  Production technology is concave and constant returns to scale, and 
identical in all countries. Throughout it will be assumed that positive quantities of both goods are 
consumed in both countries.  
 
An initial equilibrium before the spread of labour standards is represented in figure 12.  Here the 
advanced country has a labour standard and the developing country does not.    Unit cost frontiers, 
apply to both countries since technology is the same in both countries.  Factor endowments and labour 
standards differ in the two countries so they produce different sets of goods and have different factor 
prices. The developing countries have factor endowments ED and equilibrium factor prices wD and hD.  
Equilibrium outputs of the two goods in the developing countries are YD and XD.  The advanced 
countries labour standard w˜ fixes their cost of unskilled labour above the cost of unskilled labour in 
developing countries.   At w˜ advanced country firms in the unskilled labour intensive Y industry make 
less than zero profits and hence there is no active Y industry in the advanced countries3.  The zero 
profit condition in the X industry sets the price of skilled labour in the advanced countries at hA 4.   
Equilibrium output of the advanced countries is XA, and with their endowment EA there is unskilled 
unemployment of UA in the advanced countries.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The second factor is labelled skill, but can be interpreted as an aggregate of other factors (e.g. skilled labour, capital) 
besides unskilled labour for which the standard binds. 
2 The unit cost diagram is described in Woodland (1982).  Unit cost frontiers for the two goods which show 
combinations of factor prices which equate the cost of producing a unit of the good with the price of the good. Within 
the diagram factor usage vectors are drawn in factor quantity space with the origin at equilibrium factor prices.  Their 
slopes of these vectors represents factor proportions of the goods and lengths the outputs of the goods. 
3 The necessity of an industry ceasing production in these circumstances was demonstrated by Brecher (1974) 
4 A consequence of the assumptions of identical technology and that initially the minimum wage only applies in the 
advanced country is that initially the skilled wage is higher in the developing than the advanced country. This unrealistic 
feature could be avoided by assuming the advanced countries have a factor neutral technological superiority in all 
industries.  Under this assumption figure 1 would be the same as shown, except the scale on the factor price axes for the 
advanced country would be adjusted by the factor superiority, allowing the skilled wage to be higher in the advanced 
country than the developing country skilled wage.  
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4)   OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT AFTER THE SPREAD OF LABOUR STANDARDS 
 
The effect of extending the labour standard from the advanced to the developing countries is shown in 
figure 2.   The standard raises the cost of unskilled labour for firms in developing countries tow˜, 
bringing factor prices into line with the advanced countries.  The increase in costs in the labour 
intensive Y industry in the developing countries pushes up PY until the unit cost frontier for Y cuts the 
X frontier at w˜.   This higher PY allows firms in the advanced countries to produce the previously 
unprofitable good Y, so that advanced country outputs become XA and YA.   Unskilled unemployment 
in the advanced countries is eliminated as a consequence of the labour intensive good Y now being 
produced alongside good X.  In the developing countries the rise in the relative price of good Y pulls all 
the countries’ resources into the Y industry, wiping out the now unprofitable X industry.  Equilibrium 
output falls to YD, but this is insufficient to absorb the developing countries endowment of unskilled 
labour, leaving UD unemployment.     
 
Trade effects of extending the labour standard follow from these output effects.  The higher PY switches 
demand away from good Y, and this combined with the advanced countries now producing Y, implies 
that advanced countries’ imports of Y fall.   The fall is not so severe as to reverse the pattern of trade –  
the advanced countries remain exporters of the skill intensive good X, and the developing countries 
remain exporters of the unskilled intensive good Y. 
 
The most important point is the way spreading the labour standard to the developing countries shifts 
unskilled unemployment from the advanced to the developing countries, by pushing up the world price 
of the unskilled labour intensive good and changing the pattern of specialisation.  Spreading the labour 
standard to the developing countries allows the advanced countries to capture more of the world market 
for the unskilled labour intensive product, on which depend the fortunes of the countries unskilled 
workforces5.   
 
                                                 
5 The advanced countries harmonising labour standards at advanced country levels has a similar effect to the advanced 
countries imposing a tariff on their imports of the unskilled intensive product.  The price of the unskilled labour 
intensive product rises and unskilled employment rises in the advanced countries.  There is no tariff revenue though for 
the advanced countries from the labour standard. 
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5)   DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS AND THE POLITICS OF LABOUR STANDARDS 
 
Consider the effects on owners of different factors of production within the countries.   
(i) Skilled Labour in the Advanced Countries:  Lose, as the skilled wage is unchanged and they 
face a higher PY. 
(ii) Unskilled Labour in the Advanced Countries:  Lose from the higher PY with an unchanged 
wage.  The unskilled who move into employment though are the big gainers from spreading 
labour standards. 
(iii) Skilled Labour in the Developing Countries:  Lose, both through the higher PY, and the fall in 
the skilled wage. 
(iv) Unskilled Labour in the Developing Countries:  The labour standard benefits the unskilled who 
remain in employment, although some of these gains are eroded by the higher PY. Unskilled 
individuals who lose their jobs as a result of the spread of the labour standard are the big losers. 
  
Does this match up with the political debate over labour standards?  We do see organized unskilled 
labour in the advanced countries supporting the extension of labour standards to developing countries, 
with other groups in the advanced countries lukewarm or opposed.  If these organised unskilled are at 
the front of job queues and those who benefit from the rise in unskilled employment then the results of 
the paper match the politics nicely.    In the developing countries situation picture is more complex.  
The model predicts support for the extension of labour standards from the unskilled with secure jobs, 
and opposition from skilled labour (along with capital and other factors of production), as well from as 
unskilled workers at the end of job queues who are at risk of losing their jobs.   This again is consistent 
with the politics of labour standards within many developing countries, especially conflict between 
labour organisations representing the secure unskilled and owners of skilled labour and capital.    
 
The position of a country in international forums on labour standards will depend on the relative size 
and political power of the different groups of factor owners within the country.  The US enthusiasm for 
extending labour standards through trade agreements during the Clinton years would be explained by 
the greater influence of organised labour during this period.  In developing countries the skilled labour 
and capital who lose from the spread of standards tend to be politically dominant, so that most 
developing countries would oppose harmonisation.  The developing countries predicted to support 
harmonisation of standards would be those where the unskilled workers with secure jobs who gain are 
numerous or unusually political powerful.  The insecure unskilled who are the big losers in developing 
countries rarely have much voice. 
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 What is particularly interesting is the coincidence of interests of the unskilled who are jobless or hold 
insecure jobs in advanced countries and unskilled with secure jobs in developing countries.  The groups 
pushing hardest for labour standards are international labour organisations, whose constituency 
corresponds strikingly with these groups who gain.  
   
6)  WELFARE EFFECTS 
 
The main focus of the paper has been the distributional impacts as these link up with the politics of 
labour standards.   Some brief remarks about welfare, defined here as the utility of a representative 
individual who owns factors in proportion to endowments, and their endowment of unskilled 
unemployed in proportion to the unemployment rate.   From a world welfare point of view the spread of 
the labour standard will be unambiguously welfare diminishing, like the introduction of any other 
distortion into a previous undistorted economy.  The welfare impact on the advanced countries will 
depend on the relative sizes of the loss through higher PY and the gain through lower unemployment.  If 
the unemployment effects dominate and advanced country welfare rises, then developing country 
welfare must fall if world welfare is to fall.  This is the case even though the price of its export good PY 
rises. 
 
7)   CONCLUSIONS 
 
The paper has built a simple general equilibrium model of labour standards in a trading world and 
shown how spreading labour standards can hurt and help different groups in advanced and developing 
countries.  These predicted effects on the groups correspond nicely to the political positions of the 
groups.  The protectionist aspect of standards has been highlighted, but there are a number of important 
caveats.  Firstly the model has been sharply constructed to emphasise effects on the terms of trade and 
patterns of specialisation.  More general models yield broadly similar but less sharp results.  Secondly,  
the standard has been introduced into a previously undistorted economy, and the conclusions would be 
different if the standard is interacts with certain other distortions, for example monopsony in 
developing country labour markets as modelled by Naghavi (2003).     Thirdly, imperfect coverage and 
enforcement of the world labour standard would qualify the results.    Given all these qualifications the 
results offer empirical researchers a number of predictions to formally test about the political positions 
of different groups and countries.   
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